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Abstract Critics claim that short-term profit orien-
tation and high deal price strategies of private equity
(PE) firms can negatively affect the ability of manage-
ment buyouts to initiate and sustain entrepreneurial
management. This study investigates this claim by
comparing effects of majority PE backed and other
buy-outs at different levels of financial leverage on
post buy-out increases in entrepreneurial management.
We propose that PE can be used as an organizational
refocusing device that simultaneously increases entre-
preneurial and administrative management. We find
that majority PE-backed buy-outs significantly
increase entrepreneurial management practices. Fur-
thermore, the increased financial leverage positively
affects administrative management in management
buy-outs. However, the effect of high financial
leverage is larger for majority PE-backed buy-outs.
These results support the notion that PE firms help buy-
out companies develop ambidextrous organizational
change: i.e. simultaneously develop entrepreneurial
and administrative management practices. The find-
ings have important implications for practitioners and
policy makers.
Keywords Private equity  Entrepreneurship 
Buyout
JEL Classifications G24  L26  G34
1 Introduction
The international surge of private equity (PE) markets
during the first decade of this century has been
accompanied by a public debate about their effects,
both positive and negative (Financial Services
Authority 2006; PSE-Group in European Parliament
2007). PE firms have been presented, variously, as
drivers of more efficient use of organizational resources,
but also as asset strippers with adverse consequences for
employees and other stakeholders that diminish chances
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for entrepreneurial growth of the firm. These concerns
give rise to the need to evaluate the impact of PE
governance on organizations, relevant stakeholders, and
society as a whole.
A management buy-out (MBO) usually involves
the acquisition of a divested division or subsidiary or
of a private family owned firm by a new company in
which the existing management takes a substantial
proportion of the equity with substantial funding
provided by banks. PE firms involved in MBOs seek to
achieve returns on their investment through significant
equity ownership, financial leverage, and strategic and
operational monitoring and control of the companies
in their investment portfolio (Wright and Bruining
2008). PE firms can be active investors through taking
board seats and specifying contractual restrictions on
the behavior of management which include detailed
reporting requirements. Although recent attention
has focused upon PE-backed buyouts, not all MBOs
are PE-backed. Further, in some deals PE firms hold
majority positions, giving them scope for ex-post
contracting influence on the strategic policies of
portfolio companies (Cotter and Peck 2001), while
in others, especially former divisions and family-
owned firms, they may have a less active role and take
minority equity positions.
Despite the rhetoric of recent public debate, we
can distinguish between two distinct PE management
models. The traditional financial investor model
creates value at the moment of the buyout through
financial engineering and improves governance by
introducing strong financial incentives in the portfolio
firm (Cotter and Peck 2001). The other is a more active
form of PE that, in addition to financial engineering
and strong financial incentives, seeks enhanced value
creation of the portfolio company by more active
ownership. These PE firms monitor and influence the
strategy and management practices of the buyout
company through an active presence on the board
(Nikoskelainen and Wright 2007).
Previous scholarly research has suggested both
positive and negative effects of PE governance. PE-
backed leveraged buyouts introduce enhanced mone-
tary incentives for top management to create value by
improving operating performance but do not report
performance improvement resulting from entrepre-
neurial effort (Kaplan 1989; Smith 1990; Lichtenberg
and Siegel 1990; Robbie and Wright 1995). Other
studies show an increase in new product development,
stronger engagement in entrepreneurial ventures,
technological alliances, and R&D as major sources
of improving financial performance post-MBO (Bull
1989; Green 1992; Wright et al. 1990; Zahra 1995;
Bruining and Wright 2002). Lerner et al. (2008)
confirm that PE firms create both productive and
innovative growth. The experience and industry
specialization of PE firms also seems to be signifi-
cantly associated with higher performance (Cressy
et al. 2007; Meuleman et al. 2009).
Other studies show that the effect of high debt
levels associated with PE governance set severe
resource constraints post-MBO that can be harmful
to entrepreneurial performance (Andrade and Kaplan
1998; Campello 2003). In general, PE firms tend to
increase leverage as one source of value creation.
However, previous research did not separate the effect
of leverage from the potential positive effects associ-
ated with PE governance. In practice, these effects
may be confounded, because PE firms can simulta-
neously increase leverage and stimulate entrepreneur-
ial management practices. Research that ignores these
confounding effects may lead to incorrect conclusions
about assumed relationships. A second shortcoming of
previous research is that it did not adopt conceptually
grounded measures of entrepreneurial and adminis-
trative management dimensions. Therefore, the extant
buy-out literature does not provide an unambiguous
answer concerning the role of PE governance in post-
MBO performance (Cumming et al. 2007; Kaplan and
Stro¨mberg 2009).
Our study suggests several contributions to the buy-
out and PE literature to address these gaps. First, using
Stevenson’s (1983) validated conceptualization of
entrepreneurial and administrative management
(Brown et al. 2001) we provide the first detailed direct
examination of the relative importance of entrepre-
neurial versus administrative management practices
after the buy-out. Second, we extend insights regard-
ing the importance of considering the heterogeneity of
financing types in buyouts for the strategic focus of the
firm by exploring the role of PE firms in buy-out
governance. Third, and of particular relevance for the
policy debate, we reveal that majority PE investors can
increase both entrepreneurial and administrative man-
agement, depending on the level of financial leverage
of the buy-out firm. These findings have important
implications for theory and for policy makers and
practitioners, and help to obtain a more detailed
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understanding of the changes taking place post buy-
out. In particular, management buyouts may involve
ambidextrous approaches by PE firms.
2 Literature review and hypotheses
2.1 Entrepreneurial and administrative
management
Entrepreneurial management is a set of opportunity-
based management practices covering a continuum of
firm behavior that can help organizations remain vital
and contribute to firm and societal level value creation
and competitiveness (Stevenson and Gumpert 1985).
At one end of the continuum, entrepreneurial man-
agement is an outward opportunity-seeking approach
to management without regard to resources currently
controlled. At the other end, administrative manage-
ment is a more inward-oriented management approach
toward resources and competcompetenciesare cur-
rently controlled (Table 1). The six dimensions of this
model are: strategic orientation, resource orientation,
management structure, reward philosophy, growth
orientation, and entrepreneurial culture (Brown et al.
2001). Changes in entrepreneurial management are a
result of changes in one or more dimensions of this
model.
An organization can lean toward either administra-
tive or entrepreneurial management. We choose
the entrepreneurial management model because we
believe that the six dimensions of the model are
appropriate to cover conceptually the expected
changes following a buyout.
The renewed ownership structure and the increased
leverage of the buy-out firm can lead to changes in the
way the company is led by management (Robbie and
Wright 1996), or to changes in its strategic and growth
orientation (Phan and Hill 1995), its organizational
culture (Green 1992), and the allocation of resources
and choice of incentives (Reid 1996). Especially in
divisional buyouts, the strategic orientations of man-
agers are initially motivated by the market opportu-
nities they see in the business setting that they were
unable to pursue as former directors of a subsidiary
(Wright et al. 2001a). After the buyout, the directors
are spurred to allocate resources to operations with
the strongest cash flow and to eliminate unprofitable
operations (Jensen 1993; Wright et al. 1994). Man-
agement structures after buyout tend to become more
decentralized, with fewer management layers, thus
enhancing the speed of decision-making and leaving
room for managers and workers to adapt freely to
changing circumstances (Phan and Hill 1995). Mon-
itoring and rewarding by the PE firm will stimulate a
post-MBO philosophy based on creating value for the
firm in terms of improving efficiency (Harris et al.
2005) and/or innovative growth (Bruining and Wright
2002; Meuleman et al. 2009). Pre-MBO, divisional
buyout managers may find growth-oriented strategies
are limited by headquarters; after the buyout, these
barriers may be removed. Managers may be freed from
bureaucratic limitations set by the former parent
company, which opens up opportunities to carry out
Table 1 Stevenson’s conceptualization of entrepreneurial management (Brown et al. 2001)
Entrepreneurial focus Conceptual dimensions Administrative focus
Driven by perception of opportunity / Strategic orientation ? Driven by controlled resources
Many stages with minimum exposure
at each stage
A single stage with complete
commitment out of decision
Episodic use or rent of required
resources
/ Resource orientation ? Ownership or employment of required
resources
Flat, with multiple informal networks / Management structure ? Hierarchy
Based on value creation / Reward philosophy ? Based on responsibility and seniority
Rapid growth is top priority; risk
accepted to achieve growth
/ Growth orientation ? Safe, slow, steady
Promoting broad search for
opportunities
/ Entrepreneurial culture ? Opportunity search restricted by
resources controlled; failure
punished
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their own policy and plans (Green 1992; Wright et al.
2001a; Zahra 1995).
We use the entrepreneurial and administrative
management model to formulate hypotheses relating
to how the increase in financial leverage and the
majority equity of PE firms post-buyout may affect
behavior toward administrative or the entrepreneurial
management.
2.2 Hypotheses development
The level of debt increases substantially after MBO,
enabling PE investors and management to control
most of the stock. Concentrated ownership provides
PE firms with the ability to monitor and control the
strategy of the buyout target firm through their active
presence on the board (Nikoskelainen and Wright
2007). According to Cotter and Peck (2001), LBO
transactions are more likely to be financed with less
short-term and/or senior debt and are subsequently less
likely to default when buyout specialists control most
of the post-LBO equity. Furthermore, they also find
evidence of active monitoring of management by
buyout specialists through greater board representa-
tion on smaller boards.
Following Cotter and Peck (2001) we define a
majority PE position as owning 50% or more of the
voting common stock. Majority and minority PE
investors use their effort to encourage the buy-out
management team to focus on cash flow and activate
its strategic thinking. However the governance of a
minority PE investor is more defensive in nature
compared with the majority PE investor. Concentrated
ownership in PE firms means an incentive to take
action (Cotter and Peck 2001). For example, a
majority PE investor can install a supervisory board
when this is seen as necessary to add value to the firm,
or to counterbalance possible gaps in knowledge in the
management board of the company in which they have
invested. They can be more ‘‘hands-on’’ by taking
decisions to replace the incumbent management and
appoint new managers. This may bring the buyout firm
back on track faster with innovative products/services
than under the former management (Bruining and
Wright 2002). Such intervention may be especially
necessary when unexpected situations occur and the
majority PE investor seeks value creation during the
holding period by active ownership. We argue that this
offensive stance of a majority PE investor is usually
difficult for a minority PE investor. The minority PE
investors can use their voting block for some deci-
sions documented in the shareholders’ agreement, for
example to hold up the PE’s approval of expansion/
growth plans. This is a more defensive way of acting.
Hence, as contracts are incomplete, minority PE
investors may face serious limitations in the adapta-
tion of policies in cases of unexpected changes
(Williamson 1991). Majority PE investors hold such
ex-post contracting rights because strategic deci-
sions of the portfolio company generally need to be
approved by the investor, which is the owner of the
majority of authorised shareholder votes. Both types
of PE firm behavior affect the buy-out firm and may
have positive effects on post-MBO performance.
However, the minority PE investor generally trusts
the disciplining effect of debt and monetary incentives
to motivate managers to maximize the value of
the firm, whereas the majority PE investor uses, in
addition to these mechanisms, their active presence in
the supervisory board as a financial and strategic
control of the buyout firm and thus as a substitute for
debt as a disciplining device (Cotter and Peck 2001).
At the same time, both types of investor want to retain
their reputation as a good borrower to ensure access to
debt capital. In contrast, investors such as manage-
ment and banks have different incentives to improve
post-MBO firm value. For example, through decisions
about allocation of firm’s resources, managers can
transfer wealth from debt holders to themselves, which
results in more conflicts between shareholders and
debt holders than in cases of private equity ownership.
Commercial banks do not have stock ownership in
MBO firms and thus have less incentive to monitor
MBO management to increase the equity value of the
firm, rather they prefer tighter debt terms.
Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) found that
returns are driven by the size of the buy-out firm and
by acquisitions after the buyout. This supports the
importance of incentives for entrepreneurial manage-
ment to realize growth opportunities. Divisional
buyouts are initiated if managers recognize growth
opportunities that were constrained by the former
parent company (Wright et al. 2001a). PE firms
are keen to select divisions which are peripheral to
the parent’s strategy and which have to catch up with
investment. Divisional buyouts are associated with
refocusing of the strategic activities of the firm,
especially for deals involving listed corporations and
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firms in distress (Robbie et al. 1993; Wiersema and
Liebeskind 1995). Evidence from the Netherlands,
USA and UK in the 1980s shows that other types of
buyout, for example going private and buyouts from
private firms, are also followed by significant increases
in new product development and other aspects of
corporate entrepreneurship (Bull 1989; Green 1992;
Wright et al. 1992; Zahra 1995). Scholes et al. (2010)
report strategy changes after family firm buyouts that
offer large potential for growth and efficiency gains if
the founder is still involved in the business on buyout.
Divisional buyouts reduce trading dependence on the
former parent by introducing new products they had
previously been prevented from developing and by
finding new customers (Wright et al. 1990; Meuleman
et al. 2009).
The firm can be viewed as an organizational device
to establish and implement a particular cognitive
focus (Nooteboom 2009). However, firms often need a
complementary and distant cognitive focus in order to
refocus their cognitive model. After the buy-out, the
firm may need to go through a transition of cognitive
refocusing and may utilize the different and comple-
mentary cognition of the majority PE investor to
achieve this. Majority PE investors contribute to the
development of a new cognitive focus by assisting in
new ventures to broaden market focus and, by having
industrial experience, to assess investment in product
development (Bruining and Wright 2002). They also
contribute positively to the development of manage-
ment control systems that facilitate strategic change
(Jones 1992; Bruining et al. 2004). Lerner et al. (2008)
report that buy-outs increase patent citations after PE
firm investment with the quantity of patenting remain-
ing unchanged.
Thus, we expect that PE firms with majority equity
stakes in MBOs combine the advantages of changing
the capital structure and board governance with strong
involvement in strategic decision making and opera-
tions (Jensen 2006). PE firms need majority stakes to
achieve the specialization and control required for an
active governance role that helps buy-out firms to
develop and implement a new cognitive focus that
prepares the firm for entrepreneurial growth. Without
a majority stake, the PE firm is more likely to focus on
financial engineering and selective changes in gover-
nance, and take a more passive governance role
similar to that of banks. Hence we formulate:
Hypothesis 1 Majority PE ownership in a manage-
ment buyout is positively (negatively) related to entre-
preneurial management (administrative management).
Debt levels normally increase after buy-out, leading to a
reduction of agency costs and an increase in firm value
through improved operating efficiency. Jensen (1986,
1989) predicts positive effects on business performance
from higher debt levels post-MBO because incumbent
managers take better decisions than before. Before the
divisional buyout, the large and complex parent firm
frequently lacks appropriate control and incentive
mechanisms. Concentrated ownership and active
involvement by the PE investor on the board combined
with realignment of incentives makes close monitoring
of the business and controlling of the strategy possible,
with consequently improved performance (Hite and
Vetsuypens 1989). Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti
(2006) support this view, and found that high leverage or
a low equity/asset ratio reduces agency costs of outside
equity and increases firm value by constraining or
encouraging managers to act more in the interests of
shareholders. From a corporate governance perspective,
debt is a disciplining device. Investors are keen on
information that signals the ability of the firm to meet its
interest payments.
Some studies support this agency perspective
(Kaplan 1989; Cotter and Peck 2001) and report a
positive relationship between increased financial
leverage, realignment and operating performance of
buyout companies. Other studies provide evidence of
cost cutting, improved margins, and efficiency post-
MBO (Lichtenberg and Siegel 1990; Desbrie`res and
Schatt 2002; Harris et al. 2005) or show reductions in
capital requirements after a buy-out (Easterwood et al.
1989; Singh 1990; Smith 1990; Long and Ravenscraft
1993). Robbie and Wright (1995) argue that in smaller
buyouts debt commitment and covenants are impor-
tant triggers for corrective action. However, the
agency argument does not appear to receive strong
support for public to private buyouts (Halpern et al.
1999; Opler and Titman 1993; Weir et al. 2005;
Renneboog et al. 2007).
Evidence regarding the effect of high leverage on
R&D expenses is at best mixed. Long and Ravenscraft
(1993), for example, show that R&D intensity falls by
40 percent compared with pre-buyout levels as a result
of increased leverage, whereas Lichtenberg and Siegel
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(1990) did not find evidence that the R&D/sales ratio
declined post-MBO. Long and Ravenscraft (1993)
also find that R&D intensive LBO firms outperform
their non-LBO peers and LBOs that do not have any
R&D expenditure.
Being strongly committed to servicing debt obli-
gations can imply that a significant portion of the
firm’s future cash flow is not invested in new business
opportunities nor distributed to the owners, but
will only be used to reduce debt. Rappaport (1990)
emphasizes that high debt levels form new resource
constraints post-MBO and may be harmful for the
survival of the company and thus for entrepreneurial
management. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) find that the
primary cause of financial distress is high leverage,
with poor firm and industry performance as less
important causes. Post-MBO debt levels generally
increase significantly (Wright et al. 1991; Acharya
et al. 2007). Therefore we formulate:
Hypothesis 2 Increased financial leverage in a
management buyout is negatively (positively) related
to entrepreneurial management (administrative man-
agement).
Entrepreneurial management, driven by a broad
search for opportunities, involves development of new
markets, new designs, and new channels of distribution.
These variables measure business performance in terms
of growth by utilizing the upside potential in new
products and markets of the company in which they
have invested. In contrast, administrative management
is driven by opportunity search restricted by the
resources controlled and involves expanding existing
markets, established designs, and increased efficiency
of existing distribution channels. These variables
measure business performance by improving efficiency
through controlling the downside risks of existing
operations. Both entrepreneurial growth and adminis-
trative efficiency are needed on a sustainable level
because performance is a joint function of explorative
search and development and efficient exploitation of
organizational capabilities (March 1991).
The occasion of a buyout is an appropriate moment
to rethink the existing product portfolio and the long-
term adaptations needed. These fundamental consid-
erations emphasize the role of targets or aspiration
levels in regulating allocation of effort to search
(March 1988) and take place in buyouts stemming
from different sources. In the context of divisional
buyouts, lifting of the constraints imposed by the
former parent’s control enables renewal of aspirations
of the new owners, which is a significant factor that
drives the strategy and organization and their respec-
tive changes post-MBO. In the context of buyouts of
family owned firms, changes in the marketplace
require new leadership and adaptation of strategies
to facilitate transition to the new growth phase (Wright
et al. 2001b; Scholes et al. 2010). In general the new
owner-managers view the buy-out as an opportunity to
free them from control by the parent firm or by the
overly conservative founder and implement the course
of action they think is best for the company. The focus
of our paper is on the private equity investor that
exercises ownership by monitoring and controlling the
strategy of the buyout company through active pres-
ence on the board (Nikoskelainen and Wright 2007).
As a minority private equity investor it is more
difficult to be more hands-on and take an active stance
toward growth opportunities. Therefore we expect that
a private equity investor before deciding to take a
majority equity stake seriously reflects on his contri-
bution, on the supervisory board, to value creation.
He must be convinced he is able to fill a gap in
management knowledge or provide additional influ-
ence through networks which are essential if the
company in which the investment has been made is to
exploit entrepreneurial opportunities.
Because MBOs typically involve increased levels
of external funding, the PE firms need stable business
relationships with the banks as they supply the
necessary financial resources. Debt holders prefer
cash flow rights associated with earnings and debt
repaid ahead of common shareholders in case of
bankruptcy, and are reluctant to engage in risky
projects. Therefore, buyouts with very high debt levels
may face initial pressure to improve administrative
management practices post-MBO to improve the
efficiency of existing operations, and thus reduce the
debt level, before engaging in entrepreneurial man-
agement to realize growth opportunities. The literature
(Wright et al. 2000) indicates that the debt side of
buyout firm financing will trigger managerial cogni-
tion, whereas the ownership or incentive side will
activate entrepreneurial cognition. Therefore we argue
that majority PE investors will strengthen this man-
agerial cognition by improving administrative man-
agement practices such as accounting information
management, cash flow management (Mitchell, Reid
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and Terry 1997), and capital allocation processes,
including elimination of unprofitable operations
(Jensen 1993; Wright et al. 1994). Hence, with very
high debt levels the focus of the majority PE investor
will be first on administrative management to enhance
efficiency in order to reduce the risks of debt. The
more efficient monitoring and strategic control by the
majority PE investors increase administrative man-
agement and thus reduce entrepreneurial management.
Therefore we formulate:
Hypothesis 3 Majority PE ownership strengthens
the positive relationship between increased financial
leverage and administrative management.
3 Methods
3.1 Data collection
Data were collected from Dutch firms that underwent a
buyout during 1996–2004. Although recent attention
has focused solely upon PE-backed buyouts, many
management buyouts are not PE-backed (CMBOR
2010). To test our hypotheses, we need to examine both
PE and non-PE-backed management buyouts. The
complete population of CEOs of 600 Dutch buyout
firms (PE-backed and not PE-backed buyouts) in the
period 1996–2004 were contacted by the Centre
for Management Buyout Research (CMBOR) and
108 CEOs (18%) responded. All respondents were
involved in the buyout both before and after the MBO.
The names and addresses were sought from Reach, an
online database of Bureau Van Dijk. The survey took
place in March 2006 and was sent by post. Three weeks
after the mailings a reminder was sent followed by
telephone calls to companies two weeks later. Exten-
sive information was gathered and analyzed from the
CMBOR database to survey a number of characteris-
tics, for example vendor source of the buy-out, type of
financier, debt level, and how entrepreneurial man-
agement developed after the MBO-deal took place
compared with the year before the MBO.
Our sample contained approximately 35% obser-
vations where buyout firms were not PE-backed. A
potential problem in our study is that buyouts backed
by PE may differ in measured and unmeasured
characteristics from firms which are not PE-backed.
To assess potential selection bias in PE backing, a
Heckman selection bias test was used. First, we
performed logistic regression on PE ownership to
construct the Heckman selection bias control factor
(lambda) and this estimation demonstrated sufficient
explanatory power (Nagelkerke R2 = 0.469). The
control factor lambda captures the probability of PE
ownership as a function of firm size, industry charac-
teristics and buyout type. Information on unobserved
characteristics is not available in regression estimates;
however, this information is available in the residuals
of the probit analysis which we used to calculate
lambda. The procedure can therefore effectively
mitigate sample-selection bias.
The control factor was then added to the OLS
model estimate of entrepreneurial management. The
selection bias factor was not significant, indicating that
unobserved factors do not have a significant effect on
the estimates. We repeated the procedure with the
control factor lambda that captures the probability of
PE majority ownership, which also produced an
insignificant selection bias factor. Finally, we checked
for clustering in the data by looking at whether the
same PE investors backed multiple firms. Although we
cannot rule out clustering completely, we conclude
that more than half of the PE firms do not back
multiple firms in the dataset.
We tested the representativeness of the sample with
regard to the source of the MBO transaction and found
no significant differences. In addition, comparison of
results from early respondents with those from late
respondents (median split) revealed no significant
difference (P [ .69), which suggests no problem with
response bias in the survey data (Armstrong and
Overton 1977).
We examined reliability issues associated with
single-informant data by surveying additional senior
managers of randomly selected responding firms.
Seven firms provided additional informants. We
calculated an interrater agreement score (rwg) for each
variable (James et al. 1993). The median interrater
agreement ranged from 0.73 to 0.87, suggesting
adequate agreement for aggregation as it exceeds the
generally accepted cut-off point of 0.60 (Glick 1985).
Furthermore, intra-class correlations suggest strong
interrater reliability, as all correlations between the
relevant variables were significant at the 0.01 level
(Jones et al. 1983).
We also checked for common method bias by
performing Harman’s one-factor test on the self-
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reported items of the latent models included in our
study. The hypothesis of one general factor underlying
the relationships was rejected (P \ 0.001). In addi-
tion, we found four factors and the first factor did not
account for most of the variance.
3.2 Variables
3.2.1 Dependent variables
We use the operationalization of Stevenson’s con-
ceptual dimensions of entrepreneurial management
developed and validated by Brown et al. (2001) as
shown in Table 2. The items of the ten-point
entrepreneurial management scale are of the forced
types, with pairs of statements representing opposite
ends of the promoter/trustee continuum. This bi-
polar scale implies that high scores on entrepre-
neurial management are low scores on administra-
tive management, and vice versa. Next we validated
the Stevenson’s dimensions by using factor analyses
using varimax rotation. The results confirmed the
findings of Brown et al. (2001) and showed six
independent dimensions (Cronbach alpha [ 0.66),
each of which independently contributes to the
formative construct entrepreneurial management,
which indicates the degree of entrepreneurial man-
agement. The dependent variable in our study is
measured as the post-buyout increase in entrepre-
neurial management.
To examine the development of entrepreneurial and
administrative management, we performed a one-
sample t-test on the post buyout change in the
entrepreneurial management dimensions (Table 3).
For all of the dimensions we asked for the incremental
change after the buyout at the time of the survey
compared with the situation before the buyout. The
point of indifference is represented on a ten-point scale
by 5.5. The mean difference per dimension reveals a
modest but significant increase in entrepreneurial
management after the buyout, except for the dimen-
sions management structure and entrepreneurial cul-
ture. The highest increase (1.42) is for the strategic
orientation dimension followed by reward philosophy
(0.86), growth orientation (0.57), and resource orien-
tation (0.31). Entrepreneurial culture shows a decrease
in entrepreneurial management (-1.0) and becomes
more administrative in nature than before the MBO.
The only dimension that showed no significant change
is the management structure.
3.2.2 Independent variables
We measure financial leverage after buy-out as the
ratio of debt (short and long debt)/total assets (balance
sheet total) after the MBO.
Our PE measure is defined as: Does PE possess
most of the authorized voting shares in your company?
We expect that minority PE investments will not be in
a position to independently influence the decisions of
the buy-out company. Because contracts are incom-
plete, minority PE investors may face serious limita-
tions in their adaptive coordination routines with the
portfolio company in cases of unexpected changes
(Williamson 1991). Majority PE investors hold
ex-post contracting rights, because strategic decisions
of the portfolio company must generally be approved
by the investor which holds most of the authorised
shareholder votes.
3.2.3 Control variables
As the nature and extent of entrepreneurial and
innovative opportunities may vary by sector, we
control for differences in industry, distinguishing
dummy variables for trade, manufacturing, and ser-
vices, and a residual category ‘‘other’’ which is used as
the baseline category. We also control for the deal
price premium (measured as the price paid for the firm
relative to the market price) because this may reflect
expected entrepreneurial opportunities. PE research
has indicated that larger deals are more likely to be
majority owned by PE firms and to involve greater
restructuring activities. Therefore, we control for
portfolio firm size (measured as the number of full-
time employees at the time of the buyout). Introducing
entrepreneurial and innovative actions is likely to take
time, possibly longer than administrative management
changes. Therefore, we control for the duration of the
buy-out at the time of the study (measured as the time
since the buyout). Finally, we included the source of
the buyout (divisional or family buyout versus other
sources of buyouts) to control for the level of pre-
MBO entrepreneurial focus of the buyout (Wright
et al. 2000). Previous research indicates that the
level of entrepreneurial management is relatively low
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Table 2 Operationalization of entrepreneurial management (Brown et al. 2001)
1. As we define our strategies, our major
concern is how to best utilize the
resources we control.
Strategic orientation (a = 0.81) As we define our strategies, we are driven
by our perception of opportunity. We are
not constrained by the resources at (or not
at) hand.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2. We limit the opportunities we pursue on
the basis of our current resources.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Our fundamental task is to pursue
opportunities we perceive as valuable and
then to acquire the resources to exploit
them.
3. The resources we have significantly
affect our business strategies.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Opportunities control our business
strategies.
1. Because we do not need resources to
commence the pursuit of an opportunity,
our commitment of resources may be in
stages.
Resource orientation (a = 0.77) Because our objective is to use our
resources, we will usually invest heavily
and rapidly. (R)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2. All we need from resources is the ability
to use them.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 We prefer to totally control and own the
resources we use. (R)
5. We like to employ resources that we
borrow or rent.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 We prefer to only use our own resources in
our ventures. (R)
6. In exploiting opportunities, having the
idea is more important than just having
the money.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 When using opportunities, access to money
is more important than just having the
idea. (R)
1. We prefer tight control of funds and
operations by means of sophisticated
control and information systems.
Management structure (a = 0.80) We prefer loose, informal control. There is
a dependence on informal relationships.1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2. We strongly emphasize getting things
done by following formal processes and
procedures.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 We strongly emphasize getting things done
even if this means disregarding formal
procedures.
3. We strongly emphasize holding to tried
and true management principles and
industry norms.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 We strongly emphasize adapting freely to
changing circumstances without much
concern for past practices.
4. There is strong insistence on a uniform
management style throughout the firm.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Managers’ operating styles are allowed to
range freely from very formal to very
informal.
5. There is strong emphasis on getting line
and staff personnel to adhere closely to
their formal job descriptions.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 There is a strong tendency to let the
requirements of the situation and the
personality of the individual dictate
proper job behavior.
1. Our employees are evaluated and
compensated on the basis of their
responsibilities
Reward philosophy (a = 0.73) Our employees are evaluated and
compensated on the basis of the value
they add to the firm.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2. Our employees are evaluated and
compensated on the basis of their
responsibilities.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 We try to compensate our employees by
devising ways they can benefit from the
increased value of the firm.
3. An employee’s standing is based on the
amount of responsibility s/he has.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 An employee’s standing is based on the
value s/he adds.
4. It is generally known throughout the firm
that growth is our top objective.
Growth orientation (a = 0.71) Growth is not necessarily our top objective.
Long-term survival may be at least as
important. (R)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
5. It is generally known throughout the firm
that our intention is to grow as large and
as rapidly as possible.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 It is generally known throughout the firm
that steady and sure growth is the best
way to expand. (R)
1. We have many more promising ideas
than we have time and the resources to
pursue them.
Entrepreneurial culture (a = 0.66) We find it difficult to find a sufficient
number of promising ideas to utilize all of
our resources. (R)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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before a divisional (Meuleman et al. 2009) or family
(Scholes et al. 2010) buyout.
4 Results
Table 4 presents correlations, means, and standard
deviations relating to our variables. The correlations
between the independent variables are relatively low
(|r| \ 0.37) which indicates that multicollinearity may
not be a significant problem in our study. To further
examine multicollinearity, we calculated variance
inflation factors (VIF) for each regression equation
between the independent variables. The maximum
VIF score was 1.72, which is well below the cut-off of
10 suggested in the literature (Neter et al. 1990).
To test our three hypotheses, we estimated a
hierarchical regression model; the estimation results
are presented in Table 5. Model 1 contains only the
control variables and subsequently each model adds an
ownership variable to the model. To test our hypoth-
eses we use the results of Model 4 in Table 5.
The R2 is 0.37 which indicates that the model can
explain 37% of the variance of post buyout increase in
entrepreneurial management. Model 4 in Table 5
shows that increased financial leverage negatively
affects entrepreneurial management (b = -0.41;
P \ 0.01) and PE majority ownership positively
affects entrepreneurial management (b = 0.26; P \
.05). These findings support hypotheses H1 and H2.
Furthermore we found no significant correlation
between majority PE ownership and financial leverage
(Table 4). Yet, the effect of the interaction between
majority PE ownership and financial leverage on
entrepreneurial management is negative and signifi-
cant (b = -0.22; P \ 0.05), which supports hypoth-
esis H3 that PE majority ownership increases the
opposite of entrepreneurial management, namely
administrative management, if financial leverage is
very high. Administrative management under condi-
tions of very high financial leverage may help to
reduce the debt level of the firm. Thus, overall the
evidence supports the notion that PE firms stimulate
entrepreneurial management in buyout firms but also
administrative management in cases of very high
levels of financial leverage.
We performed several robustness checks. First,
because of the possibility of recall bias, we conducted
estimates using different time frames and compared
the results for early MBOs (1996–2000) with those for
Table 2 continued
2. Changes in the society-at-large often
give us ideas for new products and
services.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Changes in society-at-large seldom lead to
commercially promising ideas for our
firm. (R)
3. We never experience a lack of ideas that
we can convert into profitable products/
services.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 It is difficult for our firm to find ideas that
can be converted into profitable products/
services. (R)
Table 3 Test on
post buy-out increase
in entrepreneurial
management
Mean Mean
difference
T value P value
Dimension
Strategic orientation 6.92 1.42 7.60 \0.00
Resource orientation 5.81 0.31 2.03 \0.05
Management structure 5.62 0.12 0.76 ns
Reward philosophy 6.36 0.86 6.02 \0.00
Growth orientation 6.07 0.57 2.87 \0.01
Entrepreneurial culture 4.50 -1.00 -5.57 \0.00
Overall model
Post MBO increase in entrepreneurial
management
6.10 0.60 5.58 \0.00
N = 108
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late MBOs (2000–2004). Subsequently, we compared
regressions for PE and non PE-backed buyouts
separately. The results are robust between timeframes
and financial leverage has a much more negative effect
on entrepreneurial management for majority PE-
backed firms than for other buyout firms. The differ-
ence in the coefficients is significant at the P \ 0.001
level. This supports the results from the hierarchical
regression analysis. However, the coefficient for
financial leverage for minority PE and non-PE-backed
firms is only weakly significant at the P \ 0.10 level.
Given the sample size limitations of our study, we
conclude that further research is needed to establish if
financial leverage has a negative effect on entrepre-
neurial management for minority and non-PE-backed
firms. With regard to the control variables, the
manufacturing industry variable shows lower levels
of entrepreneurship, whereas the duration variable,
Table 4 Means, standard deviations, and correlations of all variables
Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Industry: trade (1) 0.28 0.45 1
Industry: manufacturing (2) 0.26 0.44 -0.37 1
Industry: services (3) 0.20 0.41 -0.31 0.30 1
Firm size (4) 5.99 2.46 -0.06 0.02 -0.17 1
Deal price (5) 2.52 0.98 0.07 -0.11 -0.10 0.05 1
Duration (6) 3.81 2.49 0.01 -0.05 0.10 0.03 0.07 1
Debt ratio post-MBO (7) 3.20 1.37 -0.01 0.14 -0.19 0.26 -0.02 0.00 1
Majority PE ownership (8) 0.43 0.47 -0.14 0.14 -0.03 0.00 -0.22 -0.18 -0.11 1
Post-MBO increase
in entrepreneurial
management (9)
6.10 0.84 0.07 -0.22 0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.12 -0.40 0.25 1
Correlations significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) are given in bold
Table 5 Results from
hierarchical regression
analysis of the post-MBO
increase in entrepreneurial
management
P \ 0.10, * P \ 0.05,
** P \ 0.01,
*** P \ 0.001
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Control variables
Industry: manufacturing -1.11 3.28 3.13 3.66*
Industry: trade 0.05 -0.37 -0.36 -0.41
Industry: services -0.33 1.05 0.99 1.13
Firm size -0.10 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17
Duration 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.23
Deal price -0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.03
Divisional/family buyout -0.12 -0.17 -0.12 -0.10
Lambda -0.85 3.42 3.30 3.84
Ownership attributes
Majority PE (H1) 0.26* 0.26**
Financial Leverage (H2) -0.45*** -0.42*** -0.41***
Majority PE x financial leverage (H3) -0.22*
R2 0.09 0.27*** 0.32*** 0.37***
DR2 (Model 1) 0.18*** 0.23*** 0.26***
DR2 (Model 2) 0.05** 0.10**
DR2 (Model 3) 0.05*
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measured as the number of years since the buyout,
shows a weakly positive effect (b = 0.21, P \ 0.10)
on entrepreneurship post buyout.
5 Discussion
Extending limited previous research on the effects of
majority PE-backed versus other buy-outs on entre-
preneurial activity, the results of our study show that
entrepreneurial management increases after the buy-
out. Four of the six dimensions move toward the
entrepreneurial mode of management: strategic orien-
tation, reward philosophy, resource-orientation, and
growth-orientation. The largest increase we observe is
in strategic orientation and reward philosophy, which
means that the business strategy of the firm is more
driven by the perception and pursuit of valuable
opportunities, irrespective of the firm’s owned or
controlled resources, and that post-buyout managers
and employees are evaluated on the contribution to the
value they add to the firm. However, two dimensions
of entrepreneurial management behave differently; the
management structure shows no significant change
post buyout and the entrepreneurial culture moves in
the opposite direction of the entrepreneurial manage-
ment scale, specifically to the administrative manage-
ment focus. Buyout firms develop an administrative
focus in their culture, showing that controlled
resources seem to be the starting point for taking into
consideration ideas about opportunities. This contrasts
with the outcome of the four dimensions that
attach more importance to entrepreneurial manage-
ment in dealing with opportunities, the availability of
resources, value creation, and growth.
Furthermore, the findings suggest that MBOs with a
majority PE position positively affect entrepreneurial
management whereas increased leverage increases
administrative management, which encompasses both
opportunity-seeking behavior and advantage seeking
behavior. To successfully meet future customer needs
requires cognitive refocusing of CEOs and entrepre-
neurial changes in strategic, resource, and growth
orientation. Our findings are supported by Ireland and
Webb (2009), who discuss the transition between
entrepreneurial and administrative management in
terms of exploration and exploitation as a vital part of
strategic entrepreneurship. Our study indicates that PE
firms are important in this transition. Having a very
different organizational cognitive focus, PE firms can
help buy-out firms to develop and implement a new
entrepreneurial view on their business. Future research
could examine the role of PE firms in developing such
ambidextrous entrepreneurial and administrative man-
agement practices in the transition process of MBOs,
and whether minority and majority PE investors
develop different skills for this process.
Our findings have implications for practitioners
and policy makers. Our results contradict some of the
criticisms of regulatory authorities, some politicians,
and trade unions regarding the effect of PE and buy-
outs. According to the CEOs of the buyouts we
studied, PE firms do not reduce the chances of bought
out firms initiating and sustaining entrepreneurial
management. Further, PE firms may exercise admin-
istrative management to manage the debt level if the
buy-outs involve very high leverage. In this study PE
can be regarded as an ambidextrous financier: they
stimulate entrepreneurial management to create more
economic value and at the same time facilitate
administrative management in order to reduce the
risks of high leverage. Our findings from buy-outs
suggest that the development of broad-based restric-
tions on majority PE-backed buy-outs may have
detrimental effects on entrepreneurial growth of
companies. If policy makers with concerns about PE
buy-outs seek to tighten their regulation, a more
detailed approach may be needed. With regard to
practitioners, the extent of entrepreneurial manage-
ment we have identified suggests the need for careful
attention both to the skills available in buy-out teams
and the expertise in PE firms, so that financial
investors can best add value to their portfolio com-
panies. More specifically, MBOs run a higher rather
than a lower risk if high leverage is not mitigated by
active PE portfolio administrative management. Our
finding regarding the importance of duration of time
indicates that firms may need time to develop
entrepreneurial management after the buyout. This
suggests that practitioners and policy makers may
need to be careful not to adopt a short-term approach
by only focusing upon the changes that happen around
and shortly after the buyout.
As with all studies, ours has a number of limitations
that introduce possibilities for further research. We
have focused on the effects of buyouts on entrepre-
neurial and administrative management in these firms
but how this compares with the different vendor
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sources of buy-outs is not clear. Future research with
larger datasets could look at differences and similar-
ities between buyouts from divested parts of compa-
nies, of family buyouts, public to private buy-outs,
management buy-ins, or secondary buy-outs.
The study focused on the perspective of entrepre-
neurial and administrative management as seen by
CEOs involved in leading the buy-out or buy-in or the
private equity backed buy-out firm. The selected key
informants are CEOs who had been involved in
negotiating and implementing the buyouts and they
possessed the detailed information requested. Fresh
insights relating to the entrepreneurial and administra-
tive management process may be provided when
several of those involved in the process are consistently
contacted over time. For example, the perspectives of
former family owners, non-family managers, PE pro-
viders, and independent consultants could be compared
to ensure that valid and reliable evidence is collected.
Although we have examined the extent of PE
ownership, we were unable to directly explore further
the effect of specific expertise and experience of
different PE firms on entrepreneurial and administra-
tive management and performance. We did collect
data on the number of executive investors and capital
managed/advised of PE firms and use this ratio as
proxy of the intensity of monitoring. However, neither
variable was significant and, therefore, we excluded
these variables from the analysis. This is, however, an
important area for further research that can lead to
more insight, for example, regarding whether different
fund management teams in PE firms use different
monitoring intensity to stimulate entrepreneurial and
or administrative management of the company in
which they are investing. We have identified an initial
indication of the importance of buyout duration on the
emergence of entrepreneurial management but more
detailed analysis is needed to examine whether this
particularly applies to the more sticky dimensions of
entrepreneurial management dimensions, for example
structure and entrepreneurial culture. This finding may
also have implications for the investment time horizon
adopted by the particular PE investor, and this must be
investigated in future research.
This study has drawn upon a unique, representative
sample of the population of buyouts in the Nether-
lands. Further research might be carried out in other
countries to ascertain whether the findings for insti-
tutions in the Netherlands are also valid for markets
working in different institutional environments, for
example the French civil code, emerging markets in
South America and Asia, and underdeveloped regions.
Such research would add to understanding of whether
PE buy-outs and their effects are universal phenomena
or dependent upon institutional conditions.
Although the sample was relatively small, it was
representative of the population with regard to indus-
try sector and firm size. Further research might
usefully seek to expand the dataset to encompass a
larger sample. Future research may incorporate lon-
gitudinal studies, which could usefully highlight any
additional ownership and governance changes in the
life cycle of the firm and any ensuing effect on
entrepreneurial and administrative management.
Given the size of the sample, clustering involving
PE investing in multiple firms in the sample was a
possibility. Our check indicated that this was unlikely
to be a problem and could be expected to be the case,
because across the size ranges of buyouts covered by
this study, which covers a vast number of deals, there
are many PE investors in the open economy of the
Netherlands (EVCA Directory 2006).
6 Conclusions
Using a unique, representative, and focused sample
completed during the recent second wave of buy-outs
in the Netherlands, this study sought to shed light on
recent criticisms of the effect of PE firms on the
companies in which they invest. On the basis of a
theoretically grounded reconceptualization of the PE
firm as a cognitive refocusing device for buy-out firms,
we find evidence that majority PE-backed buy-outs are
associated with significant increases in both entrepre-
neurial and administrative management practices. We
also find evidence that PE-backed buy-outs increase
the effect of financial leverage on administrative
management in cases of high leverage. Our analysis
extends the limited research that has pointed to growth
and entrepreneurship after PE-backed buy-outs and
provides a more nuanced picture regarding their role in
the development of entrepreneurial and administrative
management.
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